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Título: Emergencia y evolución de las expectativas optimistas en niños de 
educación primaria.  
Resumen: Al aproximarnos al estudio del optimismo en niños, encontra-
mos la aparición de un sesgo que les lleva a elaborar predicciones optimis-
tas. Con esta investigación pretendemos conocer los cambios que se pro-
ducen en la etapa de educación primaria (6-12 años), tanto en la aparición 
del sesgo optimista como en la explicaciones que los niños hacen de sus 
predicciones. Han participado un total de 77 alumnos a los que de manera 
individual y mediante un formato de entrevista piagetiana se les ha pedido 
realizar predicciones sobre diferentes situaciones hipotéticas. Tras un pri-
mer análisis para establecer si la predicción del niño implicaba un cambio 
en sentido optimista o pesimista, se han categorizado las respuestas ofreci-
das por los niños al argumentar su predicción. Los resultados muestran que 
los participantes en esta investigación consideran más probable el cambio 
positivo para eventos psicológicos o híbridos que para los biológicos, y que 
estos cambios son más probables entre los niños de menor edad. En cuan-
to a las explicaciones de estos cambios, los niños consideran que la propia 
naturaleza o el paso del tiempo pueden ser responsables de los mismos sin 
mediar otro tipo de intervenciones. Igualmente, razones parecidas suelen 
dar los niños mayores para explicar el mantenimiento de las situaciones.  
Palabras clave: Sesgo optimista, optimismo; educación primaria, predic-
ciones, atribuciones. 
  Abstract: When we study optimism in children, we note the temporary 
emergence of a bias that leads them to make optimistic predictions. In this 
study we intend to learn more about changes that can be observed in the 
optimistic bias of 6- to 12-year old schoolchildren when they predict fu-
ture events, and in the way they justify those predictions. A total of 77 pu-
pils participated in this study; we evaluated each one of them individually 
with a Piagetian interview, asking them to formulate predictions about a 
series of hypothetical situations. After analyzing whether a child’s predic-
tion implied that the situation would maintain itself or would change for 
better or for worse, we classified the justifications they provided for their 
predictions. Results show that these subjects regarded positive change as 
more likely in the case of psychological or hybrid events than for purely 
biological ones, and that younger children tended to display a greater bias 
in favor of the likelihood of positive change. These younger children justi-
fied their predictions stating that nature or the passing of time could be re-
sponsible for the changes, without needing further intervention on the 
part of other agents. Older children, on the other hand, tended to provide 
similar kinds of explanations to justify their expectation of stasis.  
Keywords: optimism bias; optimism; primary education; predictions; at-
tributions 
 
   Introduction 
 
Optimism is one of the psychological constructs which has 
awakened the greatest amount of scholarly interest in recent 
years, with studies in such diverse fields as illness survival or 
school-related stress. To a great extent, this construct’s suc-
cess is one of the main areas of Positive Psychology, where it 
is associated with a series of tools and resources designed to 
help people deal with stressors (Roberts, Brown, Jonson & 
Reinke, 2005; Seligman & Csiksmihalyi, 2000); moreover, 
certain factors have favored its marketing outside scientific 
circles (Pérez, 2012). Although the impact of optimism stud-
ies is undeniable, their success also implies some specific 
risks. The most salient one is probably the lack of depth and 
rigor displayed in trivial sayings such as “simply be positive” 
or “you should start thinking positive”, catch phrases with 
which people are advised to confront change. Instead we 
find that the best way one can proceed is by applying scien-
tific tools to study different aspects of the emergence of op-
timism in the individual, along with its evolution and chang-
es, both in day-to-day life as well as in a therapeutic context.  
Although a series of authors working in the area of socio-
cognitive theory and others (Chang, 2002; Roberts et al., 
2005; Romero, 2005) have done a great job in establishing 
                                                          
* Dirección para correspondencia [Correspondence address]: 
Santos Orejudo. Departamento de Psicología y Sociología. Universidad 
de Zaragoza. C/ Pedro Cerbuna, 12. 50009. Zaragoza (Spain). 
E-mail: sorejudo@unizar.es 
the theoretical framework for optimism studies, we found 
that the least explored field therein is the emergence and 
evolution of optimistic beliefs. It is nevertheless a particularly 
relevant field, since it is easier to intervene upon optimism 
during the stage in which beliefs are being formed, rather 
than when they have already become stable (Orejudo & Te-
ruel, 2009).  
Until now, most studies about dispositional optimism 
(Scheier & Carver, 1992; 2002) and optimistic explanatory 
style (Gillham, Shatté, Reivich & Seligman, 2002) have been 
principally carried out on adults and adolescents, i.e. on peo-
ple who have already attained a certain degree of stability in 
their beliefs. A great deal of theoretical groundwork has de-
scribed adolescence as the period in which beliefs are stabi-
lized and individual differences emerge (Brissette, Scheier & 
Carver, 2002); the formal operational stage is the one in 
which major changes in the concept of self, in attributive 
reasoning and in beliefs about the future take place. Just as in 
other aspects of infant and adolescent development (Ato, 
Galián & Huescar, 2007), researchers here also take the im-
portant influence of family and environmental variables on 
the evolution of these beliefs into account (Chorpita y Bar-
low, 1998; Orejudo, Puyuelo, Fernández-Turrado y Ramos, 
2012). 
In this study we point out the importance of analyzing 
such changes in optimism in earlier developmental stages. 
Apart from ascertaining categorical differences that can be 
associated with such variables, the interest of this study 
would lie in our attempt to extend current knowledge about 
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the way certain changes take place in the course of the peri-
od when they initially emerge.  
Reviews in this field suggest that the cognitive model of 
transition to attributional theories in adults could already 
start holding sway in the mid-schoolgrades, i.e. from the age 
of 10 onwards (Gillham, Reivich & Shatté, 2002). Children 
would be able to justify any event by resorting to a greater 
number of variables, thus taking a wider range of causes into 
account – causes lying either in themselves or originating in 
third parties. In that stage of cognitive transition, children 
would also start to include the dimensions of stability and 
globality in their concept of personal abilities and personality 
traits – for example, when talk about intelligence, selfishness 
or generosity. This process reaches a stage of maturity 
around the age of twelve (Cole et al., 2008).  
Prior to those ages, a series of studies have revealed a 
certain optimistic bias in the predictions made by preschool-
ers or by children in the first years of elementary education. 
Thus, a groundbreaking study by Lockhart, Chang & Story 
(2002) found that the youngest children, ages 9 and under, 
were unconditionally positive in their judgments related to 
the future, and they found no differences in the children’s 
optimistic beliefs regarding the type of negative trait or event 
they were being questioned about.  
The most commonly displayed characteristic in those 
early ages was protective optimism – protective toward 
themselves and toward others. That state of exaggerated op-
timism led the children to perceive personality traits and abil-
ities as much more malleable and less stable than adults did. 
Changes were always expected to occur in the desired sense, 
and the children thought they could occur if they merely 
wished for them. Lockart et al. (2002) pointed out that such 
an argumentative tendency makes more sense when it is con-
sidered from the angle of evolutionary psychology, which 
views optimism as an adaptive tool.  
In this developmental phase, the child needs to acquire a 
great number of new cognitive tools and behavior strategies 
– a slow, painstaking task that requires consistency and mo-
tivation free of any negative feelings (Lockhart et al., 2002). 
Similar results regarding optimistic bias can be found in oth-
er studies by the same authors (Lockhart, Keil & Aw, 2013; 
Lockhart, Nakashima, Inagaki & Keil, 2008) and in further 
investigations of the attribution of intentions to third parties 
(Boseovski, 2012; Sato & Wakebe, 2014). 
Boseovski (2010) highlights the relevance of such opti-
mistic slants: they form part of social reasoning and play a 
relevant role in the adaptation process undergone by children 
in those ages. Optimistic bias exerts an influence on social 
reasoning and on relations among peers, as well as on the 
motivation and formation of judgments and stereotypes 
about others. Such bias is likewise considered to play a fun-
damental role in the preservation of the child’s motivation to 
learn, contributing to a high sense of self-efficacy. Develop-
ment psychology considers that a child’s cognitive resources 
concentrate their processing capacities on certain types of in-
formation.  
The cultural practices and attribution styles of adults vis-
á-vis the behavior of children (based on internal factors in 
the case of positive events, and on external factors for the 
negative ones) would help determine which elements are the 
most notable in a child’s environment. Thus it is assumed 
that optimistic beliefs have a double origin: an development 
dimension, to be sure, but also a sensitivity to cultural and 
contextual differences that increases with age (Deeb, Segall, 
Birnbaum, Ben-Eliyahu & Diesendruck, 2011; Lockhart et 
al., 2008).  
This positive – and, often, unrealistic – bias in the 
youngest children would become a maladaptive trait if it per-
sisted later on. As children grow older, they start developing 
a perception of stability in terms of abilities and personality 
traits. They start considering their own traits and those of 
others as something less changeable, more permanent; nega-
tive aspects are not only perceived as such, but also as rela-
tively immutable despite the passing of time. Therefore, in 
parallel with children’s psychological development, the di-
mension of stability would emerge as the next most relevant 
attributional style: greater age-related differences are notable 
along that dimension than in globality and internality (Cole et 
al., 2008). From that developmental moment onwards, i.e. 
from the age of 10-11 on, the first pessimistic feelings 
emerge (Lockhart et al., 2002), and optimistic bias tends to 
disappear (Boseovski, 2010). 
An additional element that can help us understand the 
children’s reasoning during these stages is essentialism. Thus, 
children tend to found their explanations on the viewpoint 
that human beings possess a determined set of traits and 
characteristics that are a constituent part of their being 
(Diesendruck & Eldror, 2011; Gelman, 2004; Gelman, Hey-
man & Legare, 2007; Newman, Bloom & Knobe, 2014). Es-
sentialism postulates that children construct their concepts 
on the basis of naïve theories, and not just through associa-
tive learning strategies or by progressing solely from the per-
ceptual to the conceptual; instead, all of these aspects have 
simultaneous roles to play (Karmiloff-Smith, 1994). Within 
the perspective of essentialism, a child’s implicit theories and 
specific beliefs in a certain domain are that which guides 
his/her categorization process. When justifying their reason-
ing, children would resort to optimistic bias, positing that 
positive traits are essential attributes and not modifiable (en-
tity theories), whereas negative traits would be considered 
modifiable (incremental theories; cf. Boseovski, 2010; New-
man et al., 2014). 
Thus, the role of perceptual resemblance would be rele-
gated to a secondary level when we consider that theoretical 
keys to understanding, based on attributions of causality and 
on beliefs about different areas of life, are what leads indi-
viduals to detect and prioritize certain perceptions over oth-
ers (Peraita, 2009). Even preschoolers make use of infor-
mation that lies beyond the obvious – for example, when 
they learn words, when they apply their acquired knowledge 
to other categories, and when they form explanations follow-
ing their own infant logic, etc. Heyman and Gelman (2000) 
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suggest that children have a pronounced early tendency to 
explore and make inferences about aspects of reality that are 
neither visible nor obvious. 
On the one hand, the aforementioned studies (Gelman, 
2004; Gelman, Heyman & Legare, 2007; Lockhart et al., 
2002) evaluated a series of situations or personal traits whose 
content had a determining influence on the tendency of sub-
jects’ beliefs when they were asked to predict an optimistic 
or pessimistic future. The perceived stability/mutability of 
personal traits is clearly affected by the type and nature 
thereof – more concretely, by their origin: whether they are 
more of a biological or psychological nature (and this fits in 
well with the essentialist viewpoint).  
Heyman & Gelman (2000) found that preschoolers are 
already capable of distinguishing between physical and psy-
chological traits, although at that early age they are only ca-
pable of emitting systematic judgments about physical ones. 
Moreover, they differentiate natural from non-natural traits 
by applying a greater amount of determinism when they 
characterize their perceived image of different people. As 
evaluated traits become more psychological, and as inter-
viewed subjects grow older (9 to 10 yrs. old), their judgments 
become less unidimensional, and they start attributing causes 
to a wider range of non-determinant possibilities such as the 
effects exerted by society, family environment  
This last study fits in well with the aforementioned one 
by Karmiloff-Smith (1994), which described the way young 
children use natural-category essentialism to organize their 
knowledge in modules (Karmiloff-Smith, 1994), and it also 
has parallels with studies that explain how children confer a 
clear innateness to certain social categories that might seem 
biologically determined, such as race or gender (Del Río & 
Strasser, 2007). 
Although studies of the evolution of optimism in chil-
dren have amassed a large body of knowledge, and although 
the existence of optimistic bias in the different knowledge 
areas of children is a well-established fact, it would still be 
relevant to go into further depth on a number of aspects re-
lated with specific areas, individual differences related to 
those areas, prevalence data (Boseovski, 2010).  
In this study we investigate optimist beliefs in Spanish 
children: no studies in this domain of knowledge have been 
previously conducted in our country. We refer to the study 
by Lockhart et al. (2002) as our methodological point of de-
parture and of reference. Our objectives are the following: 1) 
to analyze the presence of optimistic bias in children when 
they evaluate positive and negative events, and 2) to identify 
the justifications they provide for each one of their predic-
tions, and to interpret the results. Our hypothesis of depar-
ture, based on the study by Lockhart et al. (2002), is the fol-
lowing: since younger children do not tend to differentiate 
certain traits from others in terms of their deterministic 
weight, they would not view biological vs. psychological 
traits as very different in terms of stability either. Older-aged 
children, however, would ascribe a greater stability to biolog-
ical traits, and possibly propound more realistic arguments to 
justify their predictions.  
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
A sample of 77 schoolchildren ages 7 to 12 was selected 
from 2nd grade, 4th grade and 6th grade classes in an ele-
mentary school in Zaragoza. The natural cohorts were sub-
sequently classified by age in three groups for investigation. 
Group A (7 and 8 yrs. old) contained 25 participants (32.5 % 
of the total), of whom 7 were female and 18 were male. 
Group B (9 and 10 yrs. old) contained 29 participants (37.7% 
of total), of which 11 were female and 18 were male. Finally, 
Group C (11 and 12 yrs. old) contained 23 participants 
(29.5% of total), of whom 11 were female and 12 were male. 
In total, the number of girls, i.e. 29 (37.7% of total), was 
lower than the number of boys, i.e. 48 (62.3%), whereby dis-
tribution was similar in all three groups (χ22=2.007, p=.367).  
The sample comprised different socio-economic levels: 
immigrants, pupils in need of additional tutoring. Concretely, 
47 children came from Spanish families (61.0%) and 30 chil-
dren from families of immigrants (39.0%). No relation was 
found between family origin and level of schooling 
(χ22=1.853, p=.398).  
 
Instrument 
 
In an individual semi-structured interview, we presented 
three stories to the children, following the procedure previ-
ously applied by Lockhart et al. (2002). The Lockhart study 
had used a total of 12 stories: 6 positive ones and 6 negative 
ones. In our case we only used three negative stories in total; 
children’s predictions are expected to be different in the case 
of positive or negative stories, and their optimistic bias 
would be more evident in negative ones. In all three stories, 
the main character displays a trait that he wants changed, a 
trait that is considered negative (i.e. not desirable) and which 
most people would not want to possess.  
The material was elaborated to encourage the partici-
pants to identify with the characters. The negative aspect de-
scribed in Story No. 1 – the loss of a finger – is thoroughly 
influenced by nature and therefore cannot be readily modi-
fied; Story No. 2 possesses both components, a physical one 
and a psychological one (learning difficulties); Story No. 3 
presents a problem whose origin is fundamentally psycholog-
ical – the fact of being a messy person – and which is, there-
fore less subject to determinism.  
In each one of the three stories, the negative trait was 
presented as having arisen when the main character was 5 
five years old, and it was emphasized that the trait remained 
stable until the age of 10. Participants were then asked to 
predict what the character’s situation would be like when he 
was 21. The children were asked to choose among three re-
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sponse options: extreme positive change, slight positive 
change, or no change at all (i.e. stability).  
A pictorial illustration was provided for each stage in the 
story and for each one of the potential responses. Facial ex-
pressions in all drawings were neutral. After having chosen a 
response option, participants were asked to provide a rea-
soned explanation to justify why they had chosen it. Those 
responses, recorded on audio, were transformed into quanti-
fiable data by categorizing the children’s justifications. To 
better explain our tool to the reader, we present the outline 
of Story No. 2 on the subject of learning difficulties, with its 
three alternative response options:  
 
Hybrid trait (biological-psychological) 
 
“This is Juan’s true story:  
 When Juan was 5 years old, he had great difficulties in learn-
ing the things they taught him in school. He wanted to be 
smarter. He would often imagine that he was capable of learn-
ing many things, and that he was a wise person.  
 When Juan was 10, he knew more things than when he was 5, 
but he still had many problems with learning things in school, 
as compared to other kids in his class. He still would dream of 
being a smart boy. He wanted to excel at school.  
 Now Juan has grown much older. He’s 21. He’s never been 
operated in hospital, nor has he taken medicine on a regular 
basis. How do you think his story ends?  
a) Juan still has trouble learning things in school, as com-
pared to other boys of his age. He still isn’t very smart.  
b) Juan has less problems with learning. He’s just as smart as 
other boys of his age.  
c) Juan has no problems with learning things. He’s a very 
good student. He’s one of the smartest boys of his age.” 
Procedure 
 
Data was gathered at the school the children attended. 
All parents and the school administration were informed 
about the study’s goals and gave their consent. The inter-
viewer presented the stories orally and visually to each par-
ticipant. Interviews were conducted in a classroom normally 
used to help children in need of special support; this class-
room was chosen because it was a comfortable and quiet 
place, and also a room the children knew well. Prior to each 
interview, a relaxed, cordial atmosphere was created to en-
sure that the child would feel at ease.  
After having gathered data to establish a series of catego-
ries, we followed the same steps as in our reference study 
(Lockhart et al., 2002), which also featured the description of 
reasoned causal explanations on the part of child partici-
pants. After an initial categorization, we redefined the cate-
gories with our own prototypes, using the verbatim answers 
provided by the children in our study. We eliminated two 
categories that proved to be not well-adapted to Spanish cul-
ture, and we established two new ones. Thus, for analysis, 
the children’s responses were distributed under a final and 
definitive system of categories that can be viewed in Table 1.  
Given the novelty of the category system, all responses 
were recorded by two interviewers to ensure the tool’s inter-
rater reliability. With a 95% level of confidence, differences 
in what the two interviewers recorded are not statistically 
significant: the κ coefficient is of .935, .814 y .869 for the 
biological, hybrid, and psychological stories respectively.  
 
Table 1. Categories of change predictors. 
Categories justifying predicted change Categories justifying predicted stability 
Biological/psychological explanation. The effect of nature on the mind or body of 
the protagonist is the cause of positive change.  
“his finger starts growing / coming out” 
“he’s eaten a lot” 
“he’s smarter” 
“he thinks a lot”, “...” 
Biological/psychological explanation. The child deems the positive 
intervention of nature on the mind or body of the protagonist 
impossible. 
“it can’t grow” 
“he’s lazy/clumsy/stupid”, “...” 
Explanation due to effort or practice. The change comes about thanks to the pro-
tagonist’s own efforts; it is he who takes control of the problematic situation. 
“he studies a lot” 
“he tries really hard” 
“he does a lot of exercise”, “...” 
Simple continuity across time, due to habit-forming. The trait cannot 
be changed. 
“If it was like that before, it will go on being that way” 
Explanation due to increasing age or maturity. The change comes about due to the 
transition from childhood to adulthood.  
“he’s already a grown-up” 
“he’s grown a lot” 
“many years have passed”, “...” 
Impossibility of change without intervention. The only chance for 
positive change would lie in an external intervention on the 
part of other people. 
“if they don’t sew the finger back on, he won’t have it” 
“if they don’t operate on him ...” 
“if he doesn’t get constant support...” 
“if he doesn’t study more than the others...”, “...” 
Explanation due to willpower. The child in the story wishes so much to change 
that his wishes become true. 
“because he wanted to” 
“because that was his wish”, “...” 
Does not know, or does not answer. 
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Categories justifying predicted change Categories justifying predicted stability 
Explanation due to learning. The change comes about because the protagonist 
has undergone a learning process. 
 “now he knows how” 
“he’s learned a lot” 
“they’ve taught him a lot”, “...” 
 
Explanation for any other reason. There are various reasons for change, but they 
do not fit into any of the preceding categories. 
“his mother / teacher has told him to do so, and he obeys” 
“he gets good grades”, “...” 
 
Does not know, or does not answer.  
 
Results 
 
Table 2 present the response percentages obtained for each 
one of the situations/stories under consideration. The chil-
dren were optimistic regarding changes in conditions that are 
biological (33.8%), hybrid (55.8%) and psychological 
(55.8%), although the two latter ones were judged more op-
timistically than the first type. This can also be ascertained 
from the Wilcoxon signed-rank test which shows statistically 
significant differences between biological cases, on the one 
hand, and hybrid and psychological ones on the other (Z = -
5.064 and Z = -5.222, p<.001), but not between the two lat-
ter ones (Z = 0.522, p=.602). In general, the responses that 
imply stability are 44.2% for the biological situation, but only 
7.8% and 5.2% for the hybrid and psychological ones respec-
tively.
 
Table 2. Global predictions according to type of situation. 
 Stability  Change    
 Pessimistic  Intermediate Optimistic χ2 g.l. p 
Biológica 34 44.2%  17 22.1% 26 33.8% 21.808 4 .000 
Híbrida  6 7.8%  28 36.4% 43 55.8% 11.443 4 .022 
Psicológica  4 5.2%  30 39.0% 43 55.8% 9.691 4 .046 
 
The analysis of the relation between age and type of re-
sponse for each situation showed differences in all three 
items. For the biological situation (χ24=21.808, p<.001), the 
2nd-grade children tended to provide judgments predicting 
change (57.7% were optimistic judgments and 24.0% inter-
mediate ones), 4th-grade children displayed a more hetero-
geneous pattern (27.6% optimistic, 31% intermediate, and 
35.3% pessimistic), whereas 6th-graders mostly predicted 
stability (pessimistic predictions accounted for 78.3% of all 
responses). In the case of the hybrid situation (χ24=11.443 
p<.05), a majority of the 2nd-grade children tended to pre-
dict change (80.0% optimistic, 12% intermediary); 4th-
graders were also optimistic, but to a lesser degree (51.7% 
optimistic and 44.8% intermediary) whereas 6th-graders con-
tinued to predict change (34.8% optimistic and 52.2% inter-
mediary), but with the largest percentage of pessimistic re-
sponses (13.0%). In the case of the psychological situation 
(χ24=9.691, p<.05), a pattern similar to the preceding one 
emerges: the youngest children were predominantly optimis-
tic (72.0%), and responses from older ones were distributed 
among the intermediate prediction (56.5%) and the optimis-
tic one, (30.4%), but presented the largest percentage of pes-
simistic responses (13.0%). No statistically significant differ-
ences between genders were observed.  
Regarding the way the children justified their predictions 
(Table 3), the majority of children offering optimistic re-
sponses to the biological story attributed the cause of posi-
tive change to nature itself (50%). In the second place the re-
sponses concentrated on the explanation by simply increas-
ing age, that is, to reach adulthood (26.2%). There were a 
great number of responses indicating the possibility of 
change for this biological trait; nevertheless, the proportion 
of optimistic answers in different categories was similar 
across all groups: the ‘change’ responses did not display sig-
nificant differences in terms of argumentative justification. 
Nevertheless, qualitative differences do appear among age 
categories in the ‘stability’ responses to the biological story.  
Nine-to-ten-year-olds responded pessimistically (which is 
to say, in this case, quite realistically) to the negative biologi-
cal story, and they attributed the main cause of stability to 
nature itself as invariable (58.3%) and to simple continuity 
across time (25.0%), without yet providing a solid justifica-
tion.  
Eleven-to-twelve-year-olds generally responded with a 
much more reasoned argument, justifying their choice of 
stability by invoking biological continuity (44.4%) and the 
impossibility of change without surgical intervention 
(38.9%). Thus, from 4th to 6th grade, children orient them-
selves increasingly towards realism, but still in a groping, in-
tuitive fashion: only by 6th grade are they able to justify their 
beliefs with a certain degree of soundness in their arguments.  
Table 4 presents the results from the hybrid story. In the 
children’s responses one can already note reasonings of a 
psychological type: as could be expected, they differ from 
Table 3. In the children’s causal explanations of their opti-
mistic beliefs, there is a qualitative difference according to 
age in the explanation categories of effort, learning and ma-
turity. A greater proportion of younger children respond that 
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the hybrid trait would change in a positive sense thanks to 
learning (40.9%) and through maturity/coming of age 
(27.3%). From the age of 9-10 onwards, the change is still 
mostly attributed to the learning process (50.0%); as a sec-
ond option, however, trust in effort (14.3%) and in maturity 
(10.7%) are cited in equal measure, with a slight advantage 
conferred to the ‘effort’ category. As to the oldest group (6th 
graders), the categories obtaining the greatest number of re-
sponses are clearly those of change through learning (35.0%) 
and through effort (30.0%), whereby confidence in change 
without active effort significantly diminishes.  
For the categories related to stability in the hybrid story 
prediction, we cannot obtain representative conclusions be-
cause the amount of pessimistic predictions was too scarce 
here. The only interesting element to note is that the majority 
of children who predicted stability justified it with mere con-
tinuity across time, without giving other reasons. One could 
hypothesize that when the children at this age reflect upon 
psychological aspects which they cannot observe, they do 
not yet have adequate cognitive tools at their disposal to car-
ry out well-founded introspection. In other words, beliefs in 
stability based on reasoning – as opposed to the intuitive be-
liefs we mentioned when we summarized the results from 
the biological story – would consolidate themselves toward 
the end of elementary schooling, when the child is increas-
ingly reflecting upon observable phenomena; such reasoning 
would nevertheless remain incipient during the entire phase 
if the object of belief is psychological.  
 
Table 3. Causal justifications of predictions associated with the biological 
story. 
Categories justifying stability 
 
7-8 yrs. 
old 
9-10 yrs. 
old 
11-12 yrs. 
old 
Total 
Biological or psychological 
stability 
2 7 8 17 
50.0% 58.3% 44.4% 50.0% 
Continuity across time 
1 3 2 6 
25.0% 25.0% 11.1% 17.6% 
Impossibility of change 
without intervention 
0 1 7 8 
.0% 8.3% 38.9% 23.5% 
Did not know or did not 
answer  
1 1 1 3 
25.0% 8.3% 5.6% 8.8% 
TOTAL 4 12 18 34 
Categories justifying change 
Biological / psychological 
explanation  
11 7 3 21 
55.0% 41.2% 60.0% 50.0% 
Increasing age and maturity 
4 5 2 11 
20.0% 29.4% 40.0% 26.2% 
Willpower 
1 1 0 2 
5.0% 5.9% .0% 4.8% 
Did not know or did not 
answer  
4 4 0 8 
20.0% 23.5% .0% 19.0% 
Total 20 17 5 42 
 
Regarding the psychological story (Table 5), 7-8 yr. olds 
to mostly tended to justify their optimistic beliefs by evoking 
the  passage  of  time  (50.0%).  The  group of 9-10 year olds 
 
Table 4. Causal justifications of predictions associated with the hybrid sto-
ry. 
Categories justifying stability 
 
7-8 yrs. 
old 
9-10 yrs. 
old 
11-12 yrs. 
old 
Total 
Biological or psychological 
stability 
0 1 0 1 
.0% 100.0% .0% 16.7% 
Continuity across time 
1 0 3 4 
50.0% .0% 100.0% 66.7% 
Did not know or did not 
answer  
1 0 0 1 
50.0% .0% .0% 16.7% 
Total 2 1 3 6 
Categories justifying change 
Biological or psychological 
explanation 
3 4 3 10 
13.6% 14.3% 15.0% 14.3% 
Effort/practice  
1 4 6 11 
4.5% 14.3% 30.0% 15.7% 
Increased age and maturity  
6 3 3 12 
27.3% 10.7% 15.0% 17.1% 
Learning 
9 14 7 30 
40.9% 50.0% 35.0% 42.9% 
Other reasons  
1 3 1 5 
4.5% 10.7% 5.0% 7.1% 
Did not know or did not 
answer 
2 0 0 2 
9.1% .0% .0% 2.9% 
Total 22 28 20 70 
 
tended to trust that learning would make things better 
(31.0%), with second place accorded to personal effort 
(27.6%), yet still with a high percentage of pupils whose sole 
reason for optimism would be the passage of time (24.1%). 
The next qualitative leap occurs around 6th grade, where 
50.0% of the responses concentrate on personal effort and 
the acquisition of practice. The learning process remains im-
portant for this group as well (35.0%). 
 
Table 5. Causal justifications of predictions associated with the psychologi-
cal story. 
Categories justifying stability 
 
7-8  
yrs. old 
9-10  
yrs. old 
11-12  
yrs. old 
Total 
Continuity across time 1  3 4 
 100.0%  100.0% 100.0% 
 1  3 4 
Categories justifying change 
Effort/practice 0 8 10 18 
  .0% 27.6% 50.0% 24.7% 
Increased age and maturity 12 7 1 20 
  50.0% 24.1% 5.0% 27.4% 
Willpower 0 1 0 1 
  .0% 3.4% .0% 1.4% 
Learning 3 9 7 19 
  12.5% 31.0% 35.0% 26.0% 
Other reasons 4 3 2 9 
  16.7% 10.3% 10.0% 12.3% 
Did not know or did not answer 5 1 0 6 
  20.8% 3.4% .0% 8.2% 
Total 24 29 20 73 
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Discussion and conclusions  
 
In this study we sought to further investigate the evolution 
of optimism in childhood, one of this construct’s least re-
searched aspects (Chang, 2002). We have studied the opti-
mistic bias displayed by children when they reason about re-
ality – a phenomenon that has been observed in other coun-
tries but which had not yet been investigated in Spain. Thus 
this study offers relevant data regarding the evolution of op-
timism from an age-related perspective as well as in aspects 
of content, taking into account the predictions and the justi-
fications offered by children for the possible changes they 
predict. Thus, younger children in our study do not perceive 
deterministic differences of some traits as compared to oth-
ers, and they have not estimated that there are large differ-
ences in terms of potential stability when comparing biologi-
cal and psychological traits. Older children, however, attrib-
ute greater stability to biological traits and propose more re-
alistic arguments to uphold their predictions.  
If we further reflect on observed differences among age 
groups, we can conclude that younger children (7-8 years 
old) firmly believe that negative traits will change in a posi-
tive direction in the near future, independently of the type of 
trait (biological or psychological). That optimistic tendency 
suggests that these children focus their attention on trait var-
iability independently of trait type. However, from the age of 
9 onwards, the nature of the trait – either biological or psy-
chological in origin – seems to be the variable which tends to 
condition their belief about its malleability in the future: this 
would uphold the idea of distinction among biological, hy-
brid and psychological domains (Erickson et al, 2010; Gel-
man, 2004; Gelman et al., 2007; Lockhart et al., 2002).  
From that age on, and more evidently when approaching 
the end of elementary education, children’s beliefs about trait 
stability seem to be determined by the nature they ascribe to 
each trait. In other words, the more realistic view of the 
world leads them to regard certain traits as more susceptible 
to change, and other ones as permanent. This is the moment 
from which their judgments about the future will take the 
entire scope of the stability-variability dimension into ac-
count. Similar studies, including Heyman & Gelman (2000), 
Gelman (2004), and Shtulman & Carey (2007), have investi-
gated the discriminative capacity displayed by children up to 
8 years old when distinguishing between impossible and im-
probable events in function of natural laws. According to 
these authors, young children differ markedly from adults in 
terms of the degree to which their world knowledge takes 
domain specificity into account. When young children evalu-
ate the probability of occurrence of an event, they do not 
distinguish whether it is possible or impossible according to 
natural laws because they do not ascribe different origins to 
real or imaginary events.  
Our results reveal further differences. On the one hand, 
optimistic responses do not attain the same percentages for 
all analyzed traits alike. Thus, for instance, biological traits 
pertaining to the physical world obey more realistic patterns 
than psychological or hybrid traits. It seems as if children, 
from early childhood onward, already tend to make causal 
inferences resorting to knowledge areas that differentiate be-
tween the physical, the biological and the psychological do-
main (Erickson, Keil & Lockhart, 2010; Lockhart et al., 
2013). Such explanations are similar in children of the same 
age, but the reasoning they provide for their justification in-
corporates more and more dimensions as they progressively 
accumulate personal experience and as their capacity for log-
ic improves. This tendency first becomes evident in their 
predictions of stability – and when they predict change, such 
older children also envision the possibility that the individual 
could assume responsibility for it when possible.  
This differential change pattern might uphold the hy-
pothesis that as children gradually develop greater cognitive 
capacities these tend to interact with experience. Within that 
process, children learn that psychological viz. behavioral 
traits are easier to modify thanks to effort, for instance, 
whereas other dimensions such as the biological domain 
cannot be modified as easily. Our results have likewise 
shown that younger children’s predictions are of a different 
nature than those made by adults, and that they differ among 
children according to the type of situation: their responses 
depend on the nature of the situation. The content thereby 
produced can become a specific domain (likewise associated 
with essentialism, which we referred to in the introduction).  
Other studies confirm such findings (Barnett, Sonnentag, 
Wadian, Jones & Langley, 2015; Lockhart et al. 2008, 2013) 
highlighting specific domains and their development as age 
progresses. Thus, Lockhart et al. (2013) and Barnett et al. 
(2015) studied predictions associated with effort, or with the 
use of medicinal substances or with support from the out-
side: these areas are all viewed differently according to age. 
Furthermore, Lockhart et al. (2008) found that predictions 
associated with effort differ among cultures, and that such 
differences emerge with age.  
As a final conclusion, we note that our results are very 
similar to those of other authors (Boseovski, 2012; Dweck & 
Leggett, 1988; Cole et al., 2008; Heyman & Gelman, 2000; 
Lockhart et al., 2002; 2008; Sato & Wakebe, 2014) whose 
studies we used as references. We have commented on their 
theoretical considerations by adding a few nuances. Since 
this study was carried out in the elementary education system 
in Spain, it enables us to conduct optimism studies within the 
context of our own country, providing us with a qualitative 
explanation geared to our own culture. We should note, 
however, that this study of optimistic beliefs in children does 
not yet address the theme of attributional style displayed by 
adolescents or adults as related to their personal beliefs, nei-
ther does our work have a direct link with dispositional op-
timism. Thus, although both of these kinds of optimism can 
be associated with the exercise of control (Gillham & Reiv-
ich, 2004), we cannot assume the existence of a direct paral-
lel between children’s voiced expectations in these ages – in-
fluenced, as they are, by optimistic bias – and dispositional 
optimism. Children can experience a certain feeling of con-
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trol and mastery of tasks (Boseovski, 2010), but these two 
types of optimism are qualitatively different (Orejudo & Te-
ruel, 2009). Thus, on the one hand, the type of justification 
provided by children evolves notably with age – not only in 
terms of outcome, but most importantly in terms of the way 
they explain the causes thereof. On the other hand, in this 
context no research has yet compared the attributions chil-
dren make about other people (such as the characters in the 
stories in this study) with those they make about themselves. 
The literature supports the hypothesis that children’s reason-
ing about themselves in these ages reflects a greater bias than 
when they reason about others; in other words, positive per-
sonal traits are ascribed in greater measure to internal causes 
– which are more stable – than traits displayed by others 
(Diesendruck & Lindenbaum, 2009).  
Even though our results have relevance, we view them 
with precaution due to certain limitations. First of all, we 
have obtained data reflecting the stability of these children’s 
beliefs along the time axis, but not concerning their category 
system: therefore we do not know how stable these argu-
ments actually are. It would also be fruitful to enlarge the in-
strument’s capacities by adding new biological, psychological 
and hybrid story situations, and to validate it, in order to see 
whether our hypothesis of specific domains is confirmed. 
And since we are dealing here with an intentional sample, 
there is likewise less guarantee that is representative; there-
fore, it would be advisable to conduct replication studies.  
Neither should we overlook the fact that the children in 
this sample were reasoning, via our tool, about events which 
had occurred to other people. Even though the children 
could regard those people as prototypically similar to them-
selves, they had to make inferences by placing themselves in 
a hypothetical situation. Another line of investigation would 
thus consist in relating the hypothetical stories featured in 
the interviews to events actually experienced by the children, 
framing the whole within a more open, ecological format. 
That would help us to avoid the risk that the children might 
have been eventually obeying a bias by placing themselves 
“in the shoes” of others. And in view of the above-
mentioned arguments concerning the continuity of such be-
liefs across time, it would be appropriate to find out which 
contextual or cultural factors encourage a progression to-
ward more stable and realistic systems of beliefs (Boseovski, 
2010; Gelman et al., 2007), including the attributional style 
displayed by adults, the important role played by the educa-
tional system, and the child’s personal history. Along these 
lines, Barnett et al. (2015) have found that judgments made 
about peers initially display optimistic bias; as the children 
grow older, however, they start incorporating information 
acquired from their own experience into their attributions. 
Finally, Newman, De Freitas & Knobe (2015) found that the 
moral value ascribed by children to the situations they are 
asked to judge also exerts an influence on their justifications, 
thus adding an additional element to our understanding of 
optimism as a truly important factor in psychological evolu-
tion.  
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